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et al.: Contracts

CONTRACTS
I. ATTACHMENT
Harrison v. Morris' involved a proceeding on a motion by
defendant to vacate a warrant of attachment 2 issued by the clerk
of the district court at the request of plaintiff. Harrison had instituted an action to recover monies due on a promissory note issued
in March 1973 by Morris to consolidate the balance owed to the
plaintiff on the purchase of thirty railroad car cabooses. Morris
claimed that the dismissal of attachment should be forthcoming
on the grounds that the bond required by South Carolina law in
attachment proceedings was defective, that the attachment in
this case served only to harass the defendant, and that there was
no prejudgment hearing on the merits of the attachment proceeding,3 thereby constituting a denial of due process of law. The
district court held that the cash bond filed by the plaintiff met
the statutory4 requirement,5 that the issuance of the warrant of
attachment was warranted by the facts,' and that since the merits
of the defendant's claims would be heard in the main suit, due
process was not denied by the absence of a prejudgment hearing
on the merits of the attachment.'
1. 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-932.1 (1962) provides:
Motion by owner to discharge attachment.-In all cases the defendant or any
person who establishes a right to the property attached may move to discharge
the attachment.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (1962) provides in part:
Affidavit required.-The warrant may be issued whenever it shall appear by
affidavit that a cause of action exists against the defendant, specifying the
amount of the claim and the grounds thereof, and that the defendant is: (1) A
foreign corporation or not a resident of this State; . . . or (3) . . . (b) has
removed or is about to remove any of his property from this State with intent
to defraud his creditors. ...
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-908 (1962) provides:
Minimum bond required before obtaining attachment.-Before issuing the warrant, the judge, clerk or magistrate shall require a written undertaking on the
part of the plaintiff, with sufficient surety, to the effect that if the defendant
recover judgment or the attachment be set aside by order of the court the
plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to the defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum
specified in the undertaking, which shall be at least two hundred and fifty
dollars, except in case of a warrant issued by a magistrate when it shall be at
least twenty-five dollars.
5. 370 F. Supp. at 146.
6. Id. at 146-49.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-901 (1962) provides in part:
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In two contracts of sale entered into in May 1969, Harrison
agreed to sell and Morris agreed to buy thirty cabooses located
in Greenville, South Carolina for a price of $39,050.00. Morris
intended to renovate the cabooses for use in his restaurant business as novelty items. In March 1973, Morris issued a promissory
note to Harrison in the amount of $16,406.55, such amount representing the balance owed by Morris on the May 1969 purchase.
Morris failed to make payments on the note and Harrison brought
an action for judgment thereon in November 1973. The clerk of
the district court issued a warrant of attachment preventing the
removal of the cabooses from South Carolina based upon allegations that Morris had made arrangements for the transportation
of the cabooses from Greenville, South Carolina to New Jersey
where he intended to dispose of them, thereby hindering collection of the debt owed by Morris.' The defendant made a motion
for an order dismissing the warrant of attachment which the
court treated as one alleging failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).
South Carolina law requires persons seeking an attachment
to post a bond of at least $250 in order to provide for damages that
might be incurred should the defendant prevail in the main suit
or should the attachment be set aside.'" Harrison posted the cash
bond when seeking attachment of Morris' property. The court
found that such cash bond was sufficient to satisfy the terms of
the statute and that the section does not require that a surety
bond also be acquired from the plaintiff before a warrant of attachment will issue." The court, therefore, held that the defendant failed to establish grounds for dismissal of the attachment
on the grounds of a defective posting of bond.
The second claim supporting Morris' motion for dismissal of
Grounds for attachment generally.-In any action:
(8) When any person or corporation is about to remove any of his or its property from this State . . .with intent to defraud creditors as mentioned in this
chapter;
The plaintiff at the time of issuing the summons or any time afterwards
may have the property of such defendant or corporation attached, in the manner
prescribed in this chapter, as a security for the satisfaction of such judgment as
the plaintiff may recover.
8. Id.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. 370 F. Supp. at 146.
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the attachment was that he owned other property within South
Carolina sufficiently valuable to satisfy Harrison's claim with
respect to the March 1973 note 12 and that the district court had
personal jurisdiction over Morris in the action for recovery on the
note. 13Attachment of the two railroad cars, therefore, was unnecessary. Morris further alleged that Harrison was aware of the
foregoing facts but that attachment was sought to harass the
debtor. As a factual matter, however, the court was not satisfied
that Morris' other property in South Carolina would satisfy his
debt to Harrison. Section 10-901(8) of the South Carolina Code
of Laws, 4 moreover, provides that removal of one's property from
the state for the purpose of defrauding a creditor is grounds for
attachment. With respect to Morris' allegation of harassment by
Harrison, the court pointed to the fact that in the hearing on the
motion for dismissal of attachment, the defendant admitted that
arrangements were underway to transport the attached property
to New Jersey. Coupled with the plaintiffs allegation that such
removal would prevent satisfaction of the debt due him, 5 the
intention of Morris to take the property out of South Carolina
prompted the court to hold that the attachment was necessary to
protect Harrison's interests and was not designed merely to harass the defendant.
Under South Carolina law, no notice of attachment or judicial hearing on the merits is necessary prior to the issuance of a
warrant of attachment. 6 Morris asserted that under the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Fuentes v. Shevin"7 and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 8 the
failure of South Carolina law to provide for notice and hearing
prior to seizure of the defendant's property constitutes a denial
of due process of law. The court, however, found both Fuentes
and Sniadachto be "clearly distinguishable" from a case involving attachment.
In Fuentes, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of
12. The defendant owned 28 other railroad cars located in South Carolina.
13. The South Carolina long-arm statute was used to secure personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-801 et seq.
14. See note 7 supra.
15. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-905(3)(b) (1962), supra note 3.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-932.1 (1962) provides that "[i]n all cases the defendant or
any person who establishes a right to the property attached may move to discharge the
attachment" and obtain the property.
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1973).
18. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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the prejudgment replevin provisions of Florida and Pennsylvania
law. The Supreme Court held that before property which is allegedly wrongfully detained may be transferred to another person
claiming right to possession of such property, a hearing must be
held at a "meaningful time" with adequate notice thereof given
to the affected parties. 9 The Harrison court distinguished
Fuentes by noting that the creditors in Fuentes wished to recover
goods "wrongfully detained" by debtors and not to prevent the
removal of such goods from the state and their possible conver0 The court also pointed out that
sion as was the case in Harrison."
before the clerk of court may issue a warrant of attachment, there
must exist a cause of action duly filed to which attachment may
be considered collateral or provisional.2 ' The hearing on the merits of the main cause of action satisfied the "meaningful time"
requirement and the fourteenth amendment due process require2
ments delineated by the Supreme Court in Fuentes. 1
The court also rejected the proposal by the defendant in
Harrison that the attachment of the property without a prior
hearing constituted a denial of "fundamental principles of due
process" as the Supreme Court had found in the prejudgment
garnishment of wages in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.3 In
Sniadach, the severe hardship for the wage earner resulting from
garnishment of his wages by a creditor led the Supreme Court to
hold that a prior hearing was essential in such cases., Although
the court in Harrisonheld generally that attachment proceedings
are not subject to the prior hearing requirements of actions seeking garnishment of wages, the court specifically pointed to the
failure of the defendant to allege a threat to his livelihood as the
result of the deprivation of the use of his property. 5 The court
further held that there was in fact no deprivation of defendant's
19. 407 U.S. at 80.
20. Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142, 147 (D.S.C. 1974).
21. See Plowden v. Mack, 217 S.C. 226, 60 S.E.2d 311 (1950). In Plowden, the defendant was not served with a summons or complaint until four days after the seizure of his
property by the sheriff. The court dismissed the attachment on the ground that without
a main suit, there were no interests of the plaintiff which were protected by the attachment statute and that under the statute, attachment could not constitute an independent
action.
22. 407 U.S. 67 (1973).
23. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
24. Id.
25. 370 F. Supp. at 149.
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property"6 in that a redelivery bond2 could be posted to regain the
use and enjoyment thereof until a judgment on the main suit was
handed down.
In light of the Fuentes holding, however, it no longer appears
to be of great significance to the Supreme Court that a person,
whose property is seized without a hearing, must allege a threat
to his livelihood as a result of such seizure or that the property
seized be classified as an absolute necessity of life.2 8 It was also
stated by the Court in Fuentes that the opportunity to post a
recovery bond to regain possession of the property does not
change the nature of the seizure into something less than a deprivation of property.29 As the court in Harrisonnoted, however, in
the case of replevin, possession of the property seized is transferred from the alleged debtor to his creditor.30 The creditor is
allowed through such summary replevin proceedings not only to
bind his alleged debtor's property but also to gain actual possession of that property with no prior hearing. In applying the
Fuentes "meaningful time" test, 3' the Harrison court held that
the hearing on the merits of the claimant's main cause of action
provided a prior hearing because a judgment must be had before
the property is actually taken from one person and delivered to
another.
The court's reasoning in Harrisonis open to attack on two
points. First, it could be argued that the prior hearing required
26. Id.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-931 (1962) provides:
Undertaking on part of defendant.-Upon application for an order to discharge
the attachment, the defendant shall deliver to the court or officer an undertaking executed by at least two sureties who are residents and freeholders or householders in the State, approved by such court or officer, to the effect that such
sureties will, on demand, pay to the plaintiff the amount of judgment that may
be recovered against the defendant in the action, not exceeding sum specified
in the undertaking which shall be at least double the amount claimed by the
plaintiff in his complaint. If it shall appear by affidavit that the property attached be less than the amount claimed by the plaintiff the court or officer
issuing the attachment may order the property to be appraised and the amount
of the undertaking shall then be double the amount so appraised.
28. In Fuentes, the Supreme Court specifically held that although the relative weight
of a property interest would be taken into consideration to determine the form of prior
hearing necessary to meet due process requirements, the Court did not wish to "get into
the business" of deciding whether a particular item of property was sufficiently "necessary" to require some form of hearing. 407 U.S. at 90 & n.21.
29. 407 U.S. at 84-85.
30. 370 F. Supp. at 149.
31. 407 U.S. at 80.
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by Sniadach and Fuentes must be held prior to any action which
has a binding effect upon a person's property. The court in
Harrisonrelied on the following language of Fuentes to justify the
"temporary possession" of a person's property by the state in an
attachment proceeding:"
We do not question the power of a State to seize goods before a
final judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors so long as those creditors have tested their claim to the
goods through the process of a fair prior hearing."
The language of the Court in Fuentes to the effect that the
creditor must have tested his claim to property prior to the state's
seizure of such property could be interpreted as including
prejudgment attachment, especially in light of the holding in
Fuentes that hardship resultant from the seizure of property is
not the important consideration in cases where property is taken
without a prior hearing. 5 In Harrison,as in Sniadach, the property of a person is placed in the "temporary possession" of the
state at the request of a claimant without a prior hearing on the
merits of the claim, thus depriving the person whose property is
taken of due process of law.
Secondly, the court distinguished Fuentes from Harrisonon
the ground that the actual possession of the property in Fuentes
was transferred from the alleged debtor to the claimant prior to
the instigation of any action by the latter, whereas under the
attachment provisions of South Carolina law, 6 a suit must be
begun in regular form37 and the proper grounds alleged before
attachment38 with the transfer of possession of the property not
taking place until after the main suit has been reduced to judgment." Such an argument ignores the holding in Sniadach that
a prejudgment holding of property by the state can amount to a
deprivation of property," and the holding in Fuentes that "a
temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'dep32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

370 F. Supp. at 148.
Id.
407 U.S. at 96.
See note 28 supra.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-901 (1962) et seq.
See note 21 supra.
See note 7 supra.
Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142, 149 (D.S.C. 1974).
395 U.S. at 344.
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rivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
It should be noted, however, that two recent Supreme Court
decisions, both written subsequent to the Harrisondecision, applied the Sniadach-Fuentestests. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co.,42 the Court upheld Louisiana's sequestration statutes43 which
resemble the South Carolina attachment provisions involved in
Harrison. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,"
however, the Court emphasized that any deviation from the rules
set out in Mitchell would cause a statute authorizing the initial
seizure of an alleged debtor's property without a prior adversarial
hearing to fail.
In Mitchell, the W.T. Grant Company filed suit in a Louisiana trial court alleging non-payment of the balance outstanding
on the installment purchase of several household appliances
which had been sold to Mitchell." Grant also alleged in the complaint the existence of a vendor's lien on the items. In a signed
affidavit affirming the truth of the allegations in the complaint,
Grant's credit manager stated that the firm had reason to believe
that Mitchell would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of
the merchandise described in the foregoing petition during the
pendency of these proceedings, and that a writ of sequestration
is necessary in the premises."47 Grant filed the required bond
($1,125) and the writ was issued, accompanied by a citation to
or to make an appearance before the
Mitchell to file a pleading
8
court within five days.

In denying Mitchell's motion to suppress the writ of sequestration, the Supreme Court recognized a duality of interests in
the property involved. 4 The Court stated that while Mitchell
held title to the sequestered merchandise, such title was encumbered by the vendor's lien held by Grant. The Court further
stated:
Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered
by the court is exclusively the property of the defendant debtor.
41. 407 U.S. at 85.
42. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
43. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. arts. 3571 et seq. (West 1960).
44. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
45. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101 et seq. (1974).
46. 416 U.S. at 601.
47. Id. at 602.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 604.
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The question is not whether a debtor's property may be seized
by his creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in the property sought to be seized. The reality is that both
seller and buyer had current, real interests in the property, and
the definition of property rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process question must take account not only of
the interests of the buyer of the property but those of the seller
as well."
The Court in Mitchell found the interest of the seller in installment sales of consumer goods, where the buyer fails to make
timely payments, to consist of the right to protect such goods
from conversion or deterioration resulting from its sale or continued use." The Court further noted the possibility of the destruction of the vendor's lien through the sale of the encumbered property to third parties. 5 The original seller would then be on an
equal footing with other creditors in attempting to satisfy his
claim against the original consumer. In light of such contingencies, the Court held that sequestration of Mitchell's property was
proper without prior notice of the taking because "[t]he notice
5' 3
itself may furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith.
It is now clear that the Fuentes requirement that a "fair prior
hearing" 54 be held to test a creditor's claim to goods held by
another does not necessarily call for a hearing before the property
is actually taken. The Court in Mitchell interpreted the language
of Fuentes to mean that an "immediate" hearing must be available to the party whose property is seized. 5 At such a hearing,
the court need only consider the matter of possession." It should
be noted, however, that the Court in Mitchell scrutinized each of
the provisions of the Louisiana sequestration statutes and found
the sections distinguishable from the constitutionally infirm statutes in Sniadach and Fuentes. There is a strong indication that
the Court desired to offer other states with similar statutes specific standards by which existing laws could be brought within
the hearing requirements of fourteenth amendment due process.
It is important to note that the Court included the applicable
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 609.
Id.
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
416 U.S. at 610.
Id.
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provisions of the Louisiana sequestration law in the Appendix to
its opinion,57 perhaps as a model for other states to follow.
As the Court observed in Mitchell," before a writ of sequestration will issue in Louisiana, a person must file an affidavit or
a verified complaint stating specific facts59 which establish some
possessory interest in the defendant's property. 0 It also must be
"within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or
waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the property from the parish, during the pendency of the action."61 Based
on the language of the Louisiana statute,612 the Court stated that
conclusory statements made in the affidavit or in the verified
complaint would not provide the requisite facts deemed necessary
for the issuance of the writ.63
The Mitchell Court also observed 4 that, although the writ
could be issued on the ex parte application of a claimant with no
notice to the defendant, the defendant is entitled to have the writ
dissolved immediately "unless the plaintiff proves the grounds
upon which the writ was issued. 61 5 This provision requires the
plaintiff to bear the burdens of proceeding and proof.66 If the
plaintiff fails to establish the existence of a valid possessory interest in the sequestered property, the writ must be dissolved and
damages may be awarded to the defendant. 7 Should the plaintiff
prove such an interest, the action will proceed to the merits and
the defendant may post a bond" to recover his property.
Finally, the Court in Mitchell noted that, in Louisiana,
"[t]he approval of a writ of sequestration is not . . . a mere
ministerial act"69 in that the "law provides for judicial control of
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
(1970).
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 620-23.
Id. at 605.
LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1960).
LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1960).

Id.
See text accompanying note 59 supra.
416 U.S. at 605; accord, Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669
416 U.S. at 606.
LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1960).
Id. at comment a.

67. Id.
68. Id.; art. 3507 provides:
A defendant may obtain the release of the property seized under a writ of
attachment or of sequestration by furnishing security for the satisfaction of any
judgment which may be rendered against him.

69. 416 U.S. at 616 n.12.
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the process from beginning to end." 0 It should be noted, however,
that in state courts outside of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, where
the Mitchell case originated, the clerk of a district court may
issue a writ of sequestration.7 ' The Court in Mitchell did not
address itself to the legality of such an issuance." In North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,7' the failure of the Georgia
garnishment statute to require participation by a judge in the
issuance of a writ of garnishment74 served as one of the factors
considered by the Court in declaring the statute unconstitutional. 5
North GeorgiaFinishinginvolved an action filed by Di-Chem
to recover an alleged indebtedness of $51,279.17 for goods sold
and delivered. At the time the suit was filed, Di-Chem secured a
writ of garnishment against the defendant's bank account by filing an affidavit with the clerk of court" alleging the existence of
the debt and that the affiant had "reason to apprehend the loss
of said sum or a part thereof unless process of Garnishment issues.

' 77 In

declaring the Georgia garnishment statute to be viola-

tive of due process, the Court noted the absence of all of the
characteristics which saved the Louisiana sequestration statute
construed in Mitchell.71 Personal knowledge of the facts sworn to
in the affidavit is unnecessary under Georgia law. 79 The requirement of the Louisiana statute to provide the specific facts supporting the plaintiff's request to seize a defendant's property and
70. Id. at 616.
71. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. arts. 282, 283 (West 1960).
72. 416 U.S. at 606 n.5.
73. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974) provides in part:
The plaintiff, his agent, or attorney at law shall make affidavit before some
officer authorized to issue an attachment, or the clerk of any court of record in
which the said garnishment is being filed or in which the main case is filed ....
75. 419 U.S. at 607.
76. See note 74 supra.
77. 419 U.S. at 604. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974) provides in part:
The plaintiff, his agent, or attorney at law shall make affidavit. . . stating...
that he has reason to apprehend the loss of. . .[the amount due in the main
suit] or some part thereof unless process of garnishment shall issue. ...

78. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-103 (1974) provides:
When the affidavit shall be made by the agent or attorney at law of the plaintiff,
he may swear according to the best of his knowledge and belief, and may sign
the name of the plaintiff to the bond, who shall be bound thereby in the same

manner as though he had signed it himself.
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to hold it as security'" is not present in the Georgia statute.8 '
Judicial participation in the issuance of a writ of garnishment is
not required under Georgia law.8 2 Finally, the Court in North
Georgia Finishingnoticed that
the only method discernible on the face of the statute to dissolve
the garnishment was to file a bond to protect the plaintiff creditor. There is no provision for an early hearing at which the
creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable
cause for the garnishment. Indeed, it would appear that without
the filing of a bond, the defendant debtor's challenge to the
garnishment will not be entertained, whatever the grounds may
be.4
In short, the procedural safeguards present in Mitchell were absent in North Georgia Finishing; consequently, the Georgia garnishment statute could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In light of the holdings in Mitchell and North Georgia
Finishing,the South Carolina attachment provisions 4 applied in
Harrison v. Morris85 are of questionable constitutional validity.
Several defects are present in the South Carolina attachment law
which are somewhat similar to those found in Georgia's garnishment statute. First, both Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing
emphasize the importance of a statutory requirement making it
mandatory for a claimant in attachment proceedings to allege
specific facts which would entitle him to a writ of attachment. 6
The relevant portion of South Carolina law applied in Harrison
provides that
[tihe warrant [of attachment] may be issued whenever it
shall appear by affidavit that a cause of action exists against the
defendant, specifying the amount of the claim and the grounds
thereof, and that the defendant.

. .

has removed or is about to

remove any of his property from this State with intent to defraud his creditors .... 87
80. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1960).

81. See note 77 supra.
82. See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974), supra note 74.
83. 419 U.S. at 607.
84. S.C. ConE ANN. §§ 10-901 (1962) et seq.
85. 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974).
86. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975); Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974).
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (1962).
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The requirement that "it shall appear by affidavit that a
cause of action exists against the defendant"" before a writ will
issue is more general in terms than the requirement found in the
Louisiana sequestration statute that such writs
shall issue only when the nature of the claim and the amount
thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of
the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition
verified by, or by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his
counsel or agent. 9
On the other hand, establishing by affidavit that a cause of action
exists against the defendant requires greater specificity in factual
allegations than does a mere statement by the affiant that there
is an "amount claimed to be due in such [an] action""0 as the
Georgia garnishment law provides. It would appear that stating
facts sufficient to show the existence of a cause of action, as
required by South Carolina law, meets the "specific fact" requirement set out by the Mitchell court."
A closer examination of the South Carolina attachment provisions applied in Harrison, however, clearly demonstrates that
a creditor must show that an alleged debtor "has removed or is
about to remove any of his property from [South Carolina] with
intent to defraud his creditors"9 before a writ of attachment will
issue. The Court in Mitchell pointed specifically to the absence
in the Louisiana sequestration statute of a "broad 'fault' standard," I' such as the showing of an intent to defraud, which "is
inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial
input."' 4 The Court further noted that
[t]he issue at [the time of application for a writ of sequestration] concerns possession pending trial and turns on the existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency. These are ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof."
88. Id.
89. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1960).
90. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974).

91. This conclusion is supported by the holding in Kania v. Atlas Wire & Cable Co.,
214 S.C. 232, 51 S.E.2d 762 (1949), where the court refused to uphold a writ of attachment
that contained mere conclusions of law without sufficient factual allegation to establish a
cause of action.
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (1962).
93. 416 U.S. at 617. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1960).
94. 416 U.S. at 617.
95. Id. at 609.
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The language in Mitchell, therefore, strongly suggests that the
existence of a "fault" standard establishes a need for an adversarial hearing prior to the initial seizure of a defendant's property
rather than mere submission by a claimant of documentary proof.
One of the foremost considerations of the Court in Mitchell
was the existence of a duality of possessory interest in the sequestered goods that the Louisiana statute sought to protect." No
such interest need be established under the attachment provisions of South Carolina law.9" A claimant may obtain attachment
of property in which he has no possessory interest merely by filing
suit against the person to whom the property belongs. In the
absence of some possessory interest, such as a vendor's lien, the
interest, if any, that a claimant possesses in the property of the
one being sued depends upon his ability to establish the defendant's liability. The Court in Fuentes recognized the "selfinterested fallibility of litigants" which often leads a party to
pursue honest though unfounded claims. 8 Such proceedings certainly are "inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input."99 Cases in which the plaintiff seeks attachment
of the defendant's property on grounds other than assertion of
some possessory interest in the property itself, therefore, may
require an adversarial hearing prior to the initial taking of the
property.
Although the hearing in cases where the plaintiff owns no
possessory interest in the property to be attached need only be
immediate and not prior to the actual seizure, the provision of
South Carolina law allowing for such immediate hearing"0 may
not meet the Mitchell standards. The Louisiana law applied in
Mitchell provided that once a defendant had filed a motion for
dismissal of the writ of sequestration, the plaintiff, at whose request the writ issued, must immediately prove the grounds supporting such issuance. 0 1 Although it is possible under South Carolina law for a defendant to have an immediate hearing on his
motion for dismissal of a writ of attachment, the burden is on
such defendant to prove that the attachment was improvidently
96. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-901 (1962).
98. 407 U.S. at 83.
99. 416 U.S. 600, 617 (1974).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-932.1 (1962), supra note 16.
101. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1960).
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issued."0 2 Again the South Carolina statute deviates from the
rules applied in Mitchell.'03
One final factor that weakens the constitutional strength of
the South Carolina attachment law is the authority given to the
clerks of state courts to accept the plaintiff's affidavit and issue
a writ of attachment based thereon.' 4 In Mitchell and North
Georgia Finishing, much importance seems to have been placed
upon judicial participation in proceedings which allow for the
taking of property without a prior hearing.' Although judicial
participation is available under the South Carolina statute, it is
not mandatory. As the Mitchell decision implied, it is possible
that so long as a writ is issued by a judge, the fact that a nonjudicial officer could have issued the writ under the provisions of the
statute will not render the entire statute void."'
In light of the Supreme Court's application of the SniadachFuentes principles in Mitchell and North GeorgiaFinishing,the
reasoning of the court in Harrison v. Morris' is not applicable
to situations involving the prejudgment attachment of property.
For those seeking to distinguish cases involving commercial contracts, as in Harrison,from cases involving consumer goods, the
Supreme Court in North Georgia Finishing issued the following
reminder:
It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will
102. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 10-932.1 (1962), supra note 16. See Kerchner & Calder Bros.

v. McCormac, 25 S.C. 461 (1885), where the court held that the question of whether the
writ issued irregularly may be determined by mere examination of the affidavit filed
seeking the writ, and failure of such affidavit to show facts adequate to state a cause of
action will require immediate dismissal. On the other hand, where the grounds for the
motion attacking the writ are that it was improvidently issued, the defendant must negative the allegations of the plaintiff's affidavit by a preponderance of the evidence before
dismissal may be granted. See also Cooke v. McCants, 214 S.C. 534, 53 S.E.2d 651 (1949),
where the court stated that the defendant's right to challenge any irregularities in the writ
is waived once bond is posted pursuant to what is now S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-931 (1962).
103. Since the Georgia garnishment statute which was applied in North Georgia
Finishingdid not provide for an early hearing, the Court was not faced with the issue of
which party would be required to bear the burdens of pleading and proof at such hearing.
The Court did seem to recognize that if there were an opportunity for an early hearing,
"the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the
garnishment." 419 U.S. at 607.
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-904 (1962) provides:
A warrant of attachment must be obtained from a judge, clerk of the court or
magistrate in which or before whom the action is brought or from a circuit judge.
105. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
106. 416 U.S. at 606, n.5.
107. 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974).
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more likely suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of
bank accounts, but the probability of irreparable injury in the
latter case is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error. We are no more
inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among
different kinds of property in applying the Due Process
Clause.' 8

It is now clear that the district court's decision in Harrison
is not an accurate application of current law. In light of the language in North Georgia Finishing,there can be little doubt that
the initial fear that Mitchell represented a complete reversal of
the reasoning in Sniadachand Fuentes was premature and exaggerated." 9 Due process considerations still apply. Courts must

insure that the procedural safeguards provided for in Sniadach
and Fuentes, as qualified and applied in Mitchell and North

Georgia Finishing, are satisfied before prejudgment seizure of
property is allowed.

II.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

In CarolinasCotton GrowersAssn., Inc. v. Arnette,10 a North
Carolina agricultural cooperative'' brought suit against four of its
South Carolina grower members ' 2 who refused to perform under
certain "forward contracts""' which provided for the production
and purchase of the defendants' 1973 cotton crops."' The Associa108. 419 U.S. at 608.
109. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629-36 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
110. 371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974). Carolinas Cotton Growers Association filed four
separate actions involving basically the same allegations against Arnette and three other
defendants. The issues of law being the same in each case, the court consolidated the cases
for trial.
111. Carolinas Cotton Growers Association was organized under the nonprofit marketing association law of North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-129 et seq. (1965). In 1961,
the Association received its charter from the State of South Carolina to conduct business
within the state as an agricultural cooperative. 371 F. Supp. at 67.
112. Membership in the Growers Association is required before a farmer may participate in the programs and sell his products through the organization. 371 F. Supp. 65, 69.
113. "Forward contracts" are contracts of sale for a given crop,.made prior to the
farmer's planting such crop and providing a certain price to be paid to the farmer regardless of the price level in the open market. As the court in Arnette noted, such contracts
remove the element of market instability from the grower's consideration so that he may
calculate the possible profits that may be made from a given crop. Id. at 66.
114. The defendants' refusal to fulfill their contract with the plaintiff can be attrib-
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tion sought specific performance of the contracts but the growers
asserted that the liquidated damages provision of the contract of
sale controlled the form of the remedy:
It is agreed between Producer and Association that the sum of
$25 per bale shall be taken to be the liquidated damages of the
Association in the event that Producer shall fail to perform his
promises and covenants faithfully under this Contract, that sum
being hereby agreed upon by Producer and Association as being
as nearly as possible the actual damage which Association will
suffer in the event of Producer's failure to perform. It is further
agreed that said sum expressly is liquidated damages and not a
penalty."'
In ordering specific performance, the court held that under
South Carolina law, damage provisions which are included in
contracts do not comprise the only remedy for the victim of a
breach unless such intent is expressly provided for in the agreement."' The court further held that the South Carolina Cooperative Marketing Act,"17 which provides for specific performance of
marketing contracts in the case of breach by a member of a growers association," ' applies to foreign corporations qualified to do
business in South Carolina."'
The growers attempted to void their contracts by paying the
amount stipulated in the contracts as liquidated damages. In so
doing, a substantial profit could have been realized by them as a
result of their breach. In requiring the defendants to "deliver in
the fall that which they sold in the spring,""' the court cited the
official comment to section 10.2-719(1)(b)' 2' which provides:
Subsection (1)(b) creates a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive. If the parties
uted to the fact that the price of cotton nearly tripled on the open market. Id.
115. Id. at 67-68.
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-719(1)(b) (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides:
[Riesort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-901 et seq. (1962).
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-973 (1962) provides:
In the event of any such breach or threatened breach of such marketing contract
by a member the association shall be entitled to an injunction to prevent the
further breach of the contract and to a decree of specific performance thereof.
119. 371 F. Supp. at 71.
120. Id. at 70.
121. See note 116 supra.
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remedy under the contract,
intend the term to describe the sole
22
this must be clearly expressed.'
The court found no such express agreement and therefore refused
to accept the growers' argument that the Association's recovery
was limited to the liquidated damage provision of the sales con123
tract.
If there had existed an express provision in the sales contract
limiting the Association's available remedies to the liquidated
damages clause, there would have been available to the Association the argument that changed circumstances caused the specified remedy to "fail of its essential purpose," thus allowing other
remedies to be sought. 124 The Arnette court noted that in any
given year, the price of cotton ordinarily fluctuates no more than
a few cents per pound.'2 In light of the typically slight changes
in price, it is probable that the liquidated damages provision of
the contract was designed to reflect the parties' estimate of damages should a breach of contract occur under ordinary circumstances. During the 1973 growing season, however, the price of
cotton nearly tripled12 and the liquidated damages provision
would prove to be grossly inadequate as a measure of the Association's damages should the growers refuse to perform. Since the
essential purpose of the liquidated damages provision was, arguably, to reflect as nearly as possible the damages which would be
2
sustained should a breach occur under ordinary circumstances, 1
other remedies should be available to the Association in light of
the substantial change in circumstances that took place during
1973.128
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the holding in Arnette
is the court's application of the South Carolina Cooperative Marketing Act 29 to a foreign corporation. The growers argued that the
Association must have been organized under the Act in order for
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-719 (Spec. Supp. 1966) (Official Comment).
123. 371 F. Supp. at 70.
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-719(2) (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides:

Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act.
125. 371 F. Supp. at 69. The court looked to evidence showing the average price of
cotton over a period of approximately thirteen years to support its conclusion.
126. Id.
127. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
128. See note 124 supra.
129. See note 117 supra.
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the Act to apply.'30 The growers also contended that because Carolinas Cotton Growers Association was a North Carolina corporation and could not have been organized under the South Carolina
Cooperative Marketing Act, the court was precluded from applying the specific performance provisions 31 in this instance.'32 The
court held, however, that to follow such reasoning with regard to
the nonapplicability of the Act to a foreign corporation would be
to construe the Act as to deny such a corporation equal protection
of the laws of the state, in violation of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.'3 3 The court concluded that
once a foreign corporation has become domesticated and is qualified to do business in South Carolina, the corporation has a right
to equal protection of the laws of the state, including the specific
performance provisions of the Cooperative Marketing Act.'34
III.

ESTOPPEL

In South CarolinaSteel Corp. v. Southern Ry., 135 the South
Carolina Supreme Court interpreted a bill of lading' 3 which required timely notice of damage to goods during shipment to include instances of substantial compliance where timely notification of damage was received by a third party.1 37 The court also
held that the carrier railroad was estopped from denying liability
when a claim was filed beyond the specified time period as a
result of oral instructions given by the carrier's agent."
South Carolina Steel shipped fabricated steel beams by rail
from Greenville to its consignee, Commonwealth Edison, in Illinois. Southern, the carrier, transferred the shipment to a receiv130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-902(3) provides that "[tihe term 'association' means any
corporation organized under this chapter."
131. See note 118 supra.
132. 371 F. Supp. at 71.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see note 118 supra.
135. 262 S.C. 543, 206 S.E.2d 828 (1974).
136. The bill of lading complied with the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §
20(11) (1970) which states in part:
(11) Liability of initial and delivery carrierfor loss; limitation of liability;
notice and filing of claim: . . . [I]t shall be unlawful for any such receiving or
delivering common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise
a shorter period for the filing of claims than nine months. ...
137. 262 S.C. at 548-49, 206 S.E.2d at 831.
138. Id.
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ing railroad'39 which subsequently completed delivery. Shortly
after delivery, Southern received written damage reports from the
receiving railway. Six months later, South Carolina Steel received copies of the same reports from its consignee and immediately contacted Southern, discussed the contents of the damage
reports, and requested instructions for filing a claim. Southern's
agent replied that a claim could not be processed until completion of the appropriate forms supplied by Southern, which required inclusion of the exact amount of loss. A year later, South
Carolina Steel received the consignee's invoice showing the precise amount of damages and immediately gave that information
to Southern, which refused to pay the claim because of South
Carolina Steel's failure to file a written claim within nine months
after delivery as specified in the bill of lading which governed the
shipment.'
South Carolina Steel brought suit in Greenville County
Court for the amount of damages and, subsequently, moved for
summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and
Southern appealed. The South Carolina Supreme Court, affirming the lower court and indicating that federal law applied,' held
139. The receiving railroad was the Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway.
140. The Uniform Domestic Straight Bill of Lading found in the applicable Uniform
Freight Classification, section 2(b) states:
As a condition precedent to recovery, claims must be filed in writing with the
receiving or delivering carrier, or carrier issuing this bill of lading, or carrier on
whose line the loss, damage, injury or delay occurred, within nine months after
delivery of the property. . . or in case of failure to make delivery, then within
nine months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed. . . .Where claims
are not filed. . . in accordance with the foregoing provisions, no carrier hereunder shall be liable, and such claims will not be paid.
141. In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913), Croninger shipped a
diamond ring valued at $137.52 from Cincinnati to Augusta, Georgia but the package was
never delivered. The carrier refused to pay the claim and suit followed. According to the
schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, the rate between these two
points was 25 cents if the value of the shipment was $50 or less, and 55 cents if the
value was $125. Claiming that Croninger knew that charges were based on value and
that the package was delivered to the carrier sealed and with no mention of valuation,
the express company claimed the package would not have been carried for less than 55
cents if it had been informed of its value. Moreover, the bill of lading contained an
agreement that the value of the shipment was limited to $50 unless specifically stated
otherwise. The issue of liability depended upon whether Kentucky or federal law applied.
The Supreme Court, reversing the Kentucky court's application of state law, noted
that the [Interstate Commerce Act] supersedes all the regulations and policies
of a particular State upon the same subject. . . .It embraces the subject of the
liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue and limits his
power to exempt himself by rule, regulation or contract. Almost every detail of
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that the notice was sufficient and that Southern was estopped
from denying liability.'
The purpose of notice requirements has been previously outlined by the supreme court:
The principal ground upon which such a stipulation [that written claims be made promptly] is held to be reasonable and valid
is that carriers usually handle great numbers of shipments
which are liable for various reasons to be lost or misplaced or
injured in transporting them; and if part of a shipment has been
lost or misplaced, unreasonable delay in informing the carrier
of the fact tends to defeat an effort to trace the shipment and
find and deliver the part lost or misplaced; if a shipment has
been damaged in transportation, unreasonable delay in notifying the carrier tends to defeat any effort to ascertain the character and extent of the damage, and, therefore, subjects the carrier
to the greater possibility of having to pay fraudulent or exhorbitant claims for damages. Therefore, the carrier is entitled to
reasonably prompt notice of the loss or damage for its own protection. . . .43
the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that
Congress intended to take possession of the subject and supersede all state
regulation with reference to it.
226 U.S. at 505-06. See Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916).
Woodruff Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry., 177 S.C. 98, 101, 180 S.E.
793, 794 (1935), citing Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Whitnack Prod. Co., 258 U.S. 369, 371-72
(1922), recognized that "[i]t is established doctrine that the rights and liabilities in
respect of damage to goods moving in interstate commerce under through bills of lading
depend upon acts of Congress, agreements between the parties and common-law principles accepted and enforced in the federal courts." White v. Southern Ry., 208 S.C. 319,
329, 38 S.E.2d 111, 115-16 (1946), specifically recognized the supremacy of the ICC's
notice provision:
By the Carmack amendment . . . embodied in paragraph 11 . . . Congress

legislated directly upon the liability of carriers for loss of and damage to goods
moving in interstate commerce, and this and later federal legislation. . . on the
subject of interstate shipments is supreme and exclusive, and supersedes all
state laws.
142. 262 S.C. at 549, 206 S.E.2d at 831.
143. Deaver-Jeter Co. v. Southern Ry., 91 S.C. 503, 505, 74 S.E. 1071, 1072 (1912).
See also Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 199 (1916) where the court
stated:
The purpose of the stipulation is not to escape liability, but to facilitate prompt
investigation. And, to this end, it is a precaution of obvious wisdom, and in no
respect repugnant to public policy that the carrier by its contracts should require reasonable notice of all claims against it ever with respect to its own
operations.
241 U.S. at 201. East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. United States, 239 F.2d 417, 419 (5th
Cir. 1956), indicates that the main purpose of the written claim is to advise the carrier
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In the present action, Southern had obviously received written
notification of damage to the shipment from the receiving railroad. Since the information was exactly the same given by South
Carolina Steel seven months later, the purpose of the notice requirement had been substantially met. The court clearly noted
that "[ait no time within the nine month period could the
plaintiff-shipper have furnished the carrier any more information
than it already had in writing even if it had proceeded to timely
file a formal written claim."''
The validity of the court's holding is further strengthened by
recognition that, upon receiving notice of the damage and loss,
South Carolina Steel immediately contacted Southern and followed the latter's instructions. The court observed that "[u]nder
these circumstances we know of no reason why the carrier should
not be estopped to deny liability, simply because the claim was
not completely formalized in writing until after the expiration of
the nine month period."''
Prominent authority indicates that a shipper may not invoke
estoppel to excuse his failure to file a timely claim. 4 ' This prohithat the shipper intends to claim reimbursement so the carrier may begin the required
investigation of that claim.
144. 262 S.C. at 549, 206 S.E.2d at 831. Deaver-Jeteris clearly distinguishable:
We are not called upon to pass upon the reasonableness of the time allowed for
filing the claim under the stipulation in this case, because there can be no reason
for requiring the filing of the claim if the defendant already knew of the loss,
and that it occurred while the goods were in its possession. . . . [DIefendant
could not have been prejudiced by the failure to file the claim within the time
provided in the stipulation; hence the failure shall not be allowed to defeat
plaintiff's action.
91 S.C. 503, 506, 74 S.E. 1071, 1072 (1912). Notice was not required in Kelly v. Southern
Ry., 84 S.C. 249, 66 S.E. 198 (1909), where the railroad's agent was informed of, and had
examined, the damage to the goods transported. See also Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 178 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943 (1950), where a
shipper notified the carrier by wire eight days after the loading of the goods and two days
after their destruction in a train wreck. Actual written claim for the loss was not made
until ten months later. The circuit court, affirming the lower court's judgment for the
shipper, said:
[It is undisputed that defendant and its agents were fully aware and cognizant
of the existence of all the facts concerning the wreck and destruction of the
carload of paper. In such a situation a formal notice by plaintiff to the defendant
could not have accomplished anything more. Hence, we conclude that the carrier may not use the provisions of the bill of lading to shield itself from the
liability imposed upon it by the statutes and the common law for its negligent
destruction of the shipper's property. To hold otherwise would not be construing
the bill of ladng "in a practical way."
145. 262 S.C. at 549, 206 S.E.2d at 831. But see note 146 infra.
146. In Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916), the shipper
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bition, however, appears to apply only to estoppel based on the
carrier's conduct which resulted in the liability in the first instance. In Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. Martin," ' the United
States Supreme Court declined to determine whether the shipper
may rely upon estoppel to avoid time limitation clauses in bills
of lading. "' In South CarolinaSteel Corp., the court determined
that the applicability of estoppel depended upon whether the use
of the doctrine would allow carriers to discriminate among ship49
pers.
If the carrier be not estopped by its conduct in this case, it is
readily apparent that a carrier could discriminate by giving correct information to one shipper as to proper procedure for timely
filing of a claim, but give to a shipper, which it did not wish to
pay, incorrect information thereabout misleading such shipper
claimed that the carrier, in taking back the damaged flour and selling it, had converted
the flour and had abandoned the contract. The shipper claimed that it was no longer
bound by the contract's terms and that the release acted to relieve it from the requirements in filing a claim of loss. The Court, rejecting this view, stated:
[T]he parties could not waive the terms of the contract under which the shipment was made pursuant to the Federal Act; nor could the carrier by its conduct
give the shipper the right to ignore these terms which were applicable to that
conduct and hold the carrier to a different responsibility from that fixed by the
agreement made under the published tariffs and regulations. A different view
would antagonize the plain policy of the Act and open the door to the very
abuses at which the Act was aimed.
Id. at 197.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931), involved a shipment of
potatoes which was delivered to the wrong warehouse. The shipper, which did not discover
that the potatoes were misplaced until four days after the filing period had expired, argued
that since the carrier had made the misdelivery and the shipper had filed the claim
immediately upon discovery of the error, the carrier should be estopped to deny liability.
The Court relied on Blish to reject this argument:
[T]he fact that delivery was made contrary to instructions, due to the misunderstanding or negligence of the carrier, cannot successfully be set up as an
estoppel against the claim of a failure to comply with the requirement of the
bill of lading here involved. To allow it would be . . . to open the door for
evasion of the spirit and purpose of the [Interstate Commerce Act] to prevent
preferences and discrimination in respect of rates and service.
283 U.S. at 222. In Allen v. Davis, 125 S.C. 256, 262, 118 S.E. 614, 616 (1923), the South
Carolina Supreme Court cited Blish in its dictum:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States would seem to be clearly committed
to the doctrine that the prohibitions of the Federal law against unjust discriminations relate not only to inequality of charges and inequality of facilities, but
also to the giving of preference by means of consent judgments or the waiver of
defenses to the carrier.
147. See note 146 supra.
148. 283 U.S. at 222.
149. 262 S.C. at 548, 206 S.E.2d at 831.
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into failing to file a formal written complaint until it was too
late. 15 0

In permitting the doctrine of estoppel to be invoked, the supreme
court sought to prevent, not promote, discrimination among shippers.
A second justification for recognizing estoppel in the present
case is that the late claim resulted from misinformation given to
South Carolina Steel by Southern's agent who stated that the
exact amount of the claim must be included when such was
filed.'5' In Kelly v. Southern Ry. ,152 the carrier allowed a shipment
of flour to become contaminated. The carrier's agent examined
the flour, told the shipper to dispose of it as best he could, and
said that the carrier would "make it all right with him.' 5 3 The
shipper and carrier exchanged several letters in which carrier's
agent stated that the matter would be taken care of as soon as
the necessary investigations were complete. Subsequently, the
carrier tried to avoid liability by claiming that written notice of
the claim was not timely filed, but the court held the time requirement had been waived by the carrier's instructions:
[W]here the agent, after examination and ascertainment of the
injury, directs the disposition of the goods, or promises to adjust
the claim, the stipulation is waived. The plaintiff could not tell
for what amount to make his claim, until he had disposed of the
goods, according to the agent's directions.'54
Although the federal circuit courts have reached differing
results,'5 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted an in150. Id. at 549, 206 S.E.2d at 831.
151. Id. at 546, 206 S.E.2d at 829.
152. 84 S.C. 249, 66 S.E. 198 (1909). See note 144 supra.
153. Id. at 251, 66 S.E. at 199.
154. Id. at 252, 66 S.E. at 199-200. In the present case, the court also cited Lehigh
Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571
(1927), where
the railroad company's agent .

wrote

. . .

the defendant.

. .

advising [it]

to file its claim with the freight claim agent of the [carrier] at Philadelphia,
giving the name and address. . . .The claim was subsequently filed, in accordance-with the instructions. . . .It is now argued that, pursuant to the bill of
lading, it was required to file the claim at the point of delivery or at the point
at which the shipment originated. These letters estop the railroad company,
because they misled the consignee.
155. A review of the federal circuit courts shows a prediliction to distinguish factual
situations of earlier cases. The First Circuit requires that a claim shall
be a written document, however informal in expression, indicating an intention
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terpretation of the notice provisions that fulfills the basic purposes of the notice requirement. Substantial compliance provides
carriers with an opportunity to investigate damage claims but
does not require the claimant to provide such notice to the carrier.
The court also recognized that estoppel may be employed to attack refusals to pay late claims when delay was occasioned by
adherence to the carrier's instructions.
on the shipper's part to claim reimbursement from the carrier for a loss asserted
to have occurred in the past, and sufficiently identifying the shipment in question either on the face of the document or by reference to previous correspondence between the parties.
Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 675, 681 (1st Cir. 1951).
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits indicate that a written claim is required and an oral notice
of claim is unacceptable. Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Pioneer Prods., Inc., 256 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir. 1958); B.A. Walterman Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 295 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1961). The
Sixth Circuit additionally requires that the written claim must be made by the claimant
or his agent and not by a third party. Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
188 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 833 (1951). (Certiorari was denied because
application was not made within the time provided by law.) The Sixth Circuit has held
that the carrier's actual knowledge of the damaged condition of the goods does not alleviate the requirement to file a claim in writing. In Walterman, the carrier was given oral
notice and the carrier's agent inspected the damage and filed his own written report. The
shipper filed no written claim. The court held that the oral notice alone, even with the
carrier's knowledge, did not constitute compliance with the filing requirement in the bill
of lading. In another Sixth Circuit decision, business records submitted to the carrier were
permitted to serve as the written claim; in its decision the court carefully pointed out that
it continued to adhere to the Walterman standard requiring some form of written claim.
American Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 422 F.2d 462 (6th Cir.
1970).
The position of the Seventh Circuit differs from the preceding cases. In Hopper Paper
Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 178 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943 (1950),
the circuit court excused compliance with the requirements of the bill of lading because
of the carrier's actual knowledge of the damage. Accord, American Synthetic Rubber v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 422 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1970); Loveless v. Universal Carloading
& Dist. Co., 225 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1955) (damages noted on freight bill and carrier
acknowledged in writing that damages were sustained by carelessness in transit); SteamsRoger Corp. v. Norfolk & West. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (communications
and actual knowledge by carrier apprised it of the claim for damages and a formal claim
was not necessary). But see Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mackie, 195 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1952);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1951)
(carrier denied having knowledge of the shipment entirely, as well as any notice of damage); Delaware L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (recovery
by the shipper allowed where the carrier had received notice that a claim was being made).
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